The Dark Side of Direct Democracy: Protecting Political Speech From the Use of SLAPPs in North Dakota\u27s Political Process by Jaenicke, Brent
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 89 Number 1 Article 7 
1-1-2013 
The Dark Side of Direct Democracy: Protecting Political Speech 
From the Use of SLAPPs in North Dakota's Political Process 
Brent Jaenicke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jaenicke, Brent (2013) "The Dark Side of Direct Democracy: Protecting Political Speech From the Use of 
SLAPPs in North Dakota's Political Process," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 89 : No. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol89/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
          
 
THE DARK SIDE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY:  PROTECTING 
POLITICAL SPEECH FROM THE USE OF SLAPPS IN NORTH 
DAKOTA’S POLITICAL PROCESS 
ABSTRACT 
 
A “SLAPP” is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.  
SLAPPs are designed to silence individuals by forcing them to spend time 
and money to defend themselves in court.  They are not designed to be 
winning suits based on the merits of the claim.  Originally, SLAPPs 
involved real estate developers suing anti-developers in tort for interfering 
with economic advantage.  Their use in silencing political opponents has 
taken a new and ugly turn in North Dakota.  In Empower the Taxpayer v. 
Fong,1 a group promoting Measure 2 on the 2012 primary ballot, 
eliminating property taxes in the state, sued dozens of public officials 
speaking out against the measure in their capacities as public officials.  
Political speech is considered the most protected form of speech in the 
United States.  This article outlines the history of SLAPPs, identifies the 
suit litigated against public officials in North Dakota as a SLAPP, and 
addresses the possible remedies and deterrent measures available to 
defendants.  North Dakota has no specific laws to address the deleterious 
effects of SLAPPs on defendants.  This article provides judicial and 
legislative guidance on remedying their effects on political speech. 
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I. WHAT IS A SLAPP? 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs,2 are 
meritless lawsuits designed to silence a defendant by forcing them to spend 
time and energy defending themselves in court.  SLAPP plaintiffs, by 
definition, have improper motives.3  A plaintiff’s motive in an identified 
SLAPP is to chill a defendant’s speech or activity and to send a message to 
others who echo the defendant’s action.4  SLAPP suits are not brought with 
the intention of winning on the merits but to intimidate and harass political 
critics into silence.5  The message sent to the critics of SLAPP plaintiffs’ 
activity presents a disturbing chilling effect and an “attempt to prevent 
expected future, competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues; 
[and] the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that 
opposition will be punished . . . .”6  The primary, practical motivations of 
SLAPP plaintiffs are delay, expense, and distraction.7  Another motivation 
for plaintiffs is to depoliticize the activity by removing the controversy 
from the public or legislative realm into the judiciary where the process can 
be more easily controlled. This gives the plaintiffs a win-loss scenario, and 
thereby further stifle public debate.8  Winning, however, is not the goal of 
SLAPP plaintiffs.  Defendants win eighty to ninety percent of all SLAPPs 
on the merits.9  SLAPPs have an interesting history in the United States and 
more than a few states have taken measures to curb their effect. 
A. HISTORY OF SLAPPS 
Professor George W. Pring in his article SLAPPs:  Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation10 coined the term “SLAPP” and provides an 
 
2. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1989). 
3. Id. at 3-9. 
4. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 395, 403 (1993). 
5. Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 
1991, at 6.  
6. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 
30 (1989). 
7. Barker, supra note 4, at 405. 
8. Id.  
9. See George W. Pring, “SLAPPs”:  Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:  A 
New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma, C534 ALI-ABA 937, *23, June 25, 1990, 
available in WESTLAW, JLR Database. 
10. Pring, supra note 2, at 4. 
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exhaustive examination of what he terms suits that “stop citizens from 
exercising their political rights or to punish them for having done so.”11  
SLAPPs date back to the 1970s, involving suits against environmental and 
community advocates.  These groups found themselves in a “role 
reversal”12 when brought into court by corporations and business interests 
to defend their advocacy activities.13  He found four commonalities:  “(1) a 
civil complaint or counterclaim for monetary damages and/or injunction; 
(2) filed against non-governmental individuals and/or groups; (3) because 
of their communications to a government body, official, or the electorate; 
(4) on an issue of some public interest or concern.”14  His study of SLAPPs 
found suits in all corners of judicial activity, including urban/suburban 
development and zoning, complaints against public officials and 
employees, environmental/animal rights, civil/human rights, neighborhood 
problems, and consumer protection.15 
SLAPPs were pervasive, despite federal16 and state17 constitutional 
provisions, civil rights laws, privilege and immunity statutes, and court 
decisions that “expressly protect citizens in their efforts to participate in and 
influence governmental decision making.”18  The Petition Clause of the 
First Amendment has been expanded to protect any lawful attempt by 
citizens to promote or discourage government action at all levels, including 
the electorate.19  The right to petition is said to be “among the most precious 
of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights”20 and one of the 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
civil and political institutions.”21  These fundamental principles serve as the 
backdrop for the reasons SLAPPs must be identified and quashed.  Public 
participation in the political process is vital to effective representative 
democracy and the free market of ideas.22  SLAPPs run counter to these 
 
11. Id. at 5-6. 
12. Id. at 7. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 8. 
15. Id. at 9. 
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17. See N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 5.  
18. Pring, supra note 2, at 9.  
19. Id. (citing S. DOC. NO. 96-16, at 1141-45 (1982); see also Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The 
Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Anti-trust Right to Petition Cases, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1984); John E. Thurman, Annotation, Right of Petition and Assembly 
Under Federal Constitution’s First Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 86 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1987)). 
20. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). 
21. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
22. Pring, supra note 2, at 11-12. 
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fundamental principles as violations of “petition-clause-protected 
activity.”23 
SLAPPs come in the guise of torts against defendants, such as 
defamation, business torts (interference with contract, business, economic 
expectancy), judicial torts (abuse of process and malicious prosecution), 
conspiracy, constitutional-civil rights violations, and nuisance.24  The most 
egregious and expensive SLAPPs were originally brought by real estate 
developers against private citizens who were opposed to massive 
development projects.25  Their voices were suddenly silenced by multi-
million dollar lawsuits.  One example pitted a developer against nine 
homeowner groups who testified against township approval of a proposed 
thirty-six home luxury development on prime shorefront acreage.26  The 
suit was brought as a libel action with damages in the amount of 
$11,200,000.27  The suit was dismissed three and a half years later on 
appeal.28  After SLAPPs were identified by legal scholars and their impact 
shown, many states moved to address their deleterious effects. 
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-SLAPP MEASURES 
Twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territory of 
Guam have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.29  States have developed different 
 
23. Id. at 12. 
24. Id. at 9. 
25. Id. at 13-15. 
26. SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 334. 
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to 752 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 
508 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 to 
8138 (1999); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to 5505 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 720.304(4) (2010); FLA. 
STAT. § 768.295 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7(4) (2000); 
7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 17101-17109 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 4 (2007); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 110/15-/25 ( 2011); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to 10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
ANN. art. 971 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 5-807 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2009); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01-
.05 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241, 246 (2004); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 41.637, .650-.670 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (Supp. 2011); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 2012); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150-.155 (Supp. 2011); 27 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 7707, 8301-8303 (2009); R.I. PUB. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
4-21-1001 to 1004 (2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011 (Supp. 2011); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1401 to 1405 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.510-.525 (2010).  In addition, the Michigan and North 
Carolina legislatures, and the U.S. Congress, recently introduced anti-SLAPP bills; however, none 
has become law.  See Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009); H.B. 
5036, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); Citizen Participation Act, H.B. DRH30241-MH-45, 
2011 Gen. Assemb. of N.C. (N.C. 2011).  In addition, although Colorado, Connecticut, and West 
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approaches to SLAPPs, some drawn narrowly to protect limited forms of 
speech, while others are drawn more broadly.30  The various statutes 
provide a “mechanism for a defendant to file a dispositive motion that 
requires the plaintiff to come forward with evidence showing the claims are 
viable . . . .”31  Attorneys’ fees and other penalties for bringing meritless 
claims attempting to stifle the defendant’s free speech or petition rights are 
also a hallmark of state anti-SLAPP statutes.32  When an anti-SLAPP 
motion is invoked by the defendant, many of the statutes shift the burden to 
the plaintiff in the pleading stage to require the plaintiff to show probability 
or possibility of success on the merits.33  This is in sharp contrast to the 
traditional pleading standard of a “short and plain statement” required by 
plaintiffs in civil litigation.34 
In states like Arizona, the anti-SLAPP statute narrowly protects 
statements to government authorities in the context of an initiative, 
referendum or recall effort, statements made to a government body in 
connection with an issue up for consideration, or statements made for the 
purpose of influencing a government action.35  Statements made to the 
general public, such as a letter to the editor of a paper denouncing a 
development company’s proposed construction, would not qualify for the 
immunity.36  Treating identical statements differently depending on whether 
they are in front of a government panel or in a newspaper seems illogical 
and antithetical to notions of protected First Amendment freedom of 
speech.37 
In contrast to Arizona, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is broad and 
protects any act of a person in furtherance of that person’s right to petition 
 
Virginia do not have anti-SLAPP statutes, the courts in those states have recognized a common 
law defense to lawsuits that retaliate against efforts by citizens to petition the government.  See 
Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo. 2004) (holding that a First 
Amendment defense to a retaliatory lawsuit be handled as a motion for summary judgment); 
Royce v. Willowbrook Cemetery, Inc., No. XO8CV010185694, 2003 WL 431909 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 3, 2003) (recognizing that a plaintiff's objectively baseless defamation suit could violate 
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993) 
(concluding that because the defendant's speech involved the exercise of the right to petition, his 
statements were absolutely protected). 
30. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, A View from the First Amendment Trenches: 
Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 WASH. L. REV. 
495, 502 (2012). 
31. Id. at 502-03. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751 (2006). 
36. Johnson, supra note 30, at 507. 
37. Id. 
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or free speech “in connection with a public issue.”38  California defined an 
“act in furtherance” broadly as: 
[A]ny written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to 
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 
interest; . . . or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of 
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest.39 
This broad protection from SLAPPs does seem to invite misuse, as well as 
the possibility that the definition of “public interest” could be construed too 
broadly by reviewing courts.40 
Other states have struggled to strike a medium between the narrow 
Arizona style anti-SLAPP statute and California’s broad rendition of the 
protective measure.  Florida’s statute prevents governmental entities from 
filing SLAPPs and prohibits suits regarding statements made in the context 
of homeowners’ associations.41  Florida’s statute is a unique example of the 
legislature taking notice of the increase in SLAPP lawsuits filed against 
private individuals by various commercial entities, but it fails to protect any 
speech outside the realm of homeowner association proceedings.42  
Washington evolved from protecting only speech made to government 
officials43 to adding speech protection if made to the public that relates to a 
matter of public concern.44 
C. SLAPPS AND POLITICAL SPEECH 
SLAPPs have a chilling effect on political speech and an undeniable 
negative impact on public participation.  Canan identifies four general 
motivations of plaintiffs who bring these meritless claims: 
(1) The intent to retaliate for successful opposition on an issue of 
public interest; (2) the attempt to prevent expected future, 
competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues; (3) the 
intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that 
opposition will be punished; and (4) a view of litigation and the 
 
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2011). 
39. See id. § 425.16(e). 
40. See discussion infra Part IV. 
41. See FLA. STAT. § 720.304 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (West 2011). 
42. Johnson, supra note 30, 508 n.81. 
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010). 
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2010). 
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use of the court system as simply another tool in a strategy to win 
a political and/or economic battle.45 
Such motivations provide insight into the “total disregard for the 
citizenship rights of others and a lack of concern over what reduced 
political debate means for American democracy.”46  The effect of one 
SLAPP in California chilled the participation of over five hundred families 
who wished to comment on the desirability of maximum housing 
development in their community.47  In a liberal democracy, free speech is 
the cornerstone that allows for efficient and effective self-rule.  Here, an 
entire community is stunned into silence by a multi-million dollar lawsuit 
alleging their complicity in a tortious act of interference with business 
advantage, development, or pollution that lacked a countervailing voice to 
curb its negative effects on the community.48  The effect travels further 
outside of the community as citizens read of significant lawsuits laid at the 
feet of those who would dare make statements against unbridled 
development.49 
The Petition Clause50 facilitates informed political change.51  It is 
designed to protect the individual by limiting the ability of government or 
entities from stifling political debate.  The sovereignty of the individual, in 
the context of political discussion, shines as one of our brightest 
achievements in American democracy.  One writer put it eloquently:   
Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be 
discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people 
that we must begin. 
The principal of the sovereignty of the people, which is always to 
be found, more or less, at the bottom of almost all human 
institutions, generally remains there concealed from view. It is 
obeyed without being recognized, or if for a moment it be brought 
to light, it is hastily cast back into the gloom of the sanctuary. 
In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the people is not 
either barren or concealed, as it is with some other nations; it is 
recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads 
freely, and arrives without impediment at its most remote 
 
45. Canan, supra note 6, at 30. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 31. 
49. Id. 
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
51. Canan, supra note 6, at 31. 
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consequences. If there be a country in the world where the doctrine 
of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it 
can be studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where 
its dangers and its advantages may be judged, that country is 
assuredly America.52 
It is against this backdrop of lofty, fundamental democratic principles 
that the purveyors of an insidious SLAPP in North Dakota silenced dozens 
of public officials.  North Dakota has no specific laws aimed at reducing or 
eliminating the effects of SLAPPs.  The special-interest group, Empower 
the Tax Payer, took full advantage of this deficiency. 
II. EMPOWER THE TAXPAYER V. FONG 
The ballot initiative process in North Dakota is enshrined in the state’s 
constitution.53  While the legislative process is vested in the legislature, “the 
people reserve the power to propose and enact laws by the initiative, 
including the call for a constitutional convention; to approve or reject 
legislative Acts, or parts thereof, by the referendum; to propose and adopt 
constitutional amendments by the initiative.”54  Whether this process of 
ballot initiative, or direct democracy, is wise for a self-governing people is 
beyond the scope of this article.  Also beyond the scope of this article, is the 
question of whether eliminating North Dakota’s property tax is good public 
policy.  This article focuses on the deleterious effect the special interest 
group, Empower the Taxpayer, had on the political process. In Empower, a 
group of public officials was hauled into court for taking a position 
allegedly in violation of state law contrary to the proponents of Measure 2.  
Measure 2 was placed on the June 12, 2012 primary ballot.  The initiative 
sought to eliminate property taxes in the state and mandate the legislature 
replace the money with different sources of revenue to be distributed to the 
various political subdivisions which currently rely on property tax revenue.  
The measure read: 
This initiated constitutional measure would amend sections 1, 4, 
14, 15, and 16 of Article X of the North Dakota Constitution and 
repeal sections 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 of that same article, eliminating 
property taxes, poll taxes, and acreage taxes, effective January 1, 
2012. The measure would require the Legislative Assembly to 
replace lost revenue to cities, counties, townships, school districts, 
 
52. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 55-56 (University of Michigan 
Press, 1863). 
53. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
54. Id. 
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and other political subdivisions with allocations of various state-
level taxes and other revenues, without restrictions on how these 
revenues may be spent by the political subdivisions.55 
Empower the Taxpayer, on behalf of itself and signatories to the ballot 
initiative, filed an action on February 14, 2012, requesting a temporary 
restraining order that defendants comply with the North Dakota Corrupt 
Practices Act56 and discontinue distributing false or misleading statements 
or take a position on Measure 2.57  After the defendants asserted the suit 
was having a chilling effect, the court scheduled a hearing in early April.58  
In mid-April, the court issued a decision as a matter of law dismissing the 
action.59  The court reflected that North Dakota’s Corrupt Practices Act is a 
criminal statute that failed to provide any statutory right to private cause of 
action.60  In other words, unless the legislature includes a provision in a 
criminal statute for private citizens to sue, no civil right exists to sue in 
court. 
Seven days before the vote on Measure 2, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court heard the appeal.61  The dismissal was affirmed on the same grounds 
the lower court posited.62  The court looked to the language of the Corrupt 
Practices Act63 as to whether the legislature impliedly intended to create a 
private right of action, as it was not expressly state in the Act.64  The court 
pointed directly to a 1991 case where the court held that an alleged 
violation of the Act65 is not grounds for a civil action.66  The court’s 
decision was handed down only two days after oral argument on June 7, 
 
55. Initiated Constitutional Measure No. 2, North Dakota Secretary of State Office, available 
at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/BallotLanguageMeasure2-June12,2012.pdf. 
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2011). 
57. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 8, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d 381, 
available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/briefs/20120191.atb.htm. 
58. Id. ¶ 10. 
59. Id. ¶ 11. 
60. Id. 
61. Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, ¶ 1, 817 N.W.2d 381, 382.  It is 
noteworthy to mention that North Dakota is one of the few states that do not regularly employ an 
appellate level court.  Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court is typically the main 
appellate body in the state judiciary.  All lower court rulings are appealable by statute to the court.  
See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
62. Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 6, 817 N.W.2d at 384. 
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2011). 
64. Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 4, 817 N.W.2d at 383. 
65. Id.  
66. District One Republican Comm. v. District One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820, 
827-28 (N.D. 1991).  Although in District One the ruling involved an election contest and not a 
ballot initiative dispute, the court adopted the reasoning.  Empower the Taxpayer, ¶ 5, 817 N.W.2d 
at 383. 
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2012 and five days before the vote on Measure 2.67  Considering the claim, 
the defendants in Empower failed to include any counter-claim for 
malicious prosecution, Rule 1168 relief, or request for attorney’s fees.  
Sanctions for violation of Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure must be made on motion and can include monetary damages and 
other non-monetary sanctions that suffice to deter repetition of the 
conduct.69 
The court opinion failed to mention anything about the chilling effect 
the suit had on the defendants. However, during oral argument Justice 
Sandstrom asked the SLAPP plaintiffs’ attorney, “[Y]our interpretation 
would say that elected officials surrender their First Amendment rights on 
classic political questions, the most protected area under the first 
amendment as far as speech is concerned?”70  Three things indicate that this 
suit is a classic example of a SLAPP.  First, both the lower court and the 
Supreme Court spoke to the impact the suit had on the ability of a defendant 
to exercise a First Amendment right to free speech.  Second, at both levels, 
the case was expedited because of those concerns.  Third, the high court 
handed down its decision affirming the suit’s dismissal a mere two days 
after oral argument.  Although no specific study of the average length of 
time between oral argument and a decision exists, from a cursory gloss of 
periods in the past year, parties typically expect a decision published 
months after oral arguments.  Because of the nature of Empower, and its 
implications on a ballot measure vote a mere handful of days from oral 
argument, an assumption can be made that the court wished to hand down 
its decision as quickly as possible. 
Despite the state high court’s efficiency in deciding Empower, the 
damage had been done.  The state’s tax commissioner, various school board 
 
67. Empower the Taxpayer, at ¶ 5, 817 N.W.2d 384. 
68. Arguably, N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(2) was violated when the case was filed in the first 
instance in February, 2012.  Rule 11 reads: 
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it, an 
attorney or self-represented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:  
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, 
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law . . .  . 
Id. 
69. N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).  Limitations on monetary sanctions are found in N.D. R. CIV. P. 
11(c)(5). 
70. Oral Argument at 5:01, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d 381, 
available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/Broadcast/20120191.rm. 
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members, state representatives, state senators, and other public officials 
with first-hand knowledge and experience with the tax structure of North 
Dakota, and the implications of changing the structure, were sued based on 
what can be colored as a specious legal argument at best.  No legal 
authority in statute or case law pointed to plaintiffs’ argument that the 
North Dakota Corrupt Practices Act71 provided a private right of action.  
These public officials were asked by private citizens to comment on the 
effects of Measure 2.  They were silenced by Empower the Taxpayer.  The 
result of Empower the Taxpayer demands that North Dakota take a serious 
look at anti-SLAPP measures to protect political speech from SLAPPs’ 
deleterious effects. 
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIAL AND DETERRENT SOLUTIONS 
Proponents of anti-SLAPP measures have proposed a myriad of 
procedural tools to combat SLAPPs such as court-ordered discovery costs, 
specific pleading standards, and accelerated preemptive judicial review.72  
These rules could be proffered by the legislature or by the courts.  
Substantive remedies include variations on traditional tort defenses and 
what are commonly referred to as SLAPP-back measures.73 
A. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES 
Probably the most basic procedural remedial measure that a party 
defending a SLAPP could utilize is specific pleading standards set by the 
rules of civil procedure.  The current standard in federal court, and most 
state courts, including North Dakota, requires a plaintiff to plead “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”74  The pleading standard for claims alleging fraud or mistake require 
a heightened standard where a “party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”75  A heightened standard of 
pleading for claims thought to be SLAPPs will allow “judicial triage that is 
essential to dismiss SLAPPs early.”76  Of course, some procedural 
mechanism, such as a defendant pleading stage motion to invoke an anti-
SLAPP statute, could require plaintiffs to meet the heightened pleading 
standard.  The value of this pleading standard is evident when utilized in 
 
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10 (2009). 
72. Barker, supra note 4, at 407-09. 
73. Id. at 414-48. 
74. Id. at 407. 
75. FED R. CIV. P. 9(b);  N.D. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
76. Barker, supra note 4, at 407. 
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conjunction with other procedural requirements, such as discovery costs, 
accelerated review, and dismissal standards.77 
Discovery generally incurs the greatest expense for parties in terms of 
time and money.78  The liberal discovery rules allowed by rules of civil 
procedure are generally to the benefit of SLAPP plaintiffs since one of their 
major motivations is to tie up defendants’ time and resources.79  A 
dissenting judge in a West Virginia case advocated for the possibility of 
amending the rules of procedure to require plaintiffs in identified SLAPP-
like claims to pay upfront costs of discovery and legal fees that would be 
refundable if the claim was won by the plaintiffs on the merits.80  Another 
possible measure allows a special motion to strike that defendants may use 
to stay discovery pending a determination of whether the claim is a 
SLAPP.81  These discovery measures would alleviate the intimidation 
associated with onerous discovery requests and deny SLAPP plaintiffs an 
important tool to cause delay and require defendants to incur unaffordable 
discovery costs.82 
Preventing SLAPPs by expediting judicial proceedings is one of the 
most important components of any court or statutory scheme.83  Expediting 
the judicial process “will not only alleviate its chilling effect on defendants, 
but it will also create disincentives for plaintiffs seeking primarily to delay 
and distract their opponents.”84  Some courts, in lieu of anti-SLAPP 
procedural statutes, have determined that challenges to plaintiff allegations 
based on constitutional rights moves the summary judgment phase back to 
 
77. Id. at 407-08. 
78. Id. at 408. 
79. See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation:  An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 407-08 (1991); see also 
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 
542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723 (1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)).   
 The liberal discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer opportunities 
for harassment, abuse, and vexatious imposition of expense that can make the mere 
pendency of a complex lawsuit so burdensome to defendants as to force them to buy 
their peace regardless of the merits of the case.   
Id. 
80. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting). 
[D]iscovery and the costs of discovery and attendant legal fees themselves may chill 
the free exercise of first amendment rights, in appropriate circumstances of gross 
imbalance of assets, I would permit the trial court to order the advance of defendant's 
costs associated with discovery from plaintiff. Should the plaintiff succeed on the 
merits, these payments would be refunded. 
Id. 
81. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (2011). 
82. Barker, supra note 4, at 408. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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the dismissal stage of the pre-trial process.85  California implemented a 
standard of review which subjects claims involving First Amendment rights 
and a “public issue” to an immediate motion to strike and review of whether 
or not the plaintiff has a “probability” of prevailing on the merits.86 
The standard of dismissal poses a challenge to anti-SLAPP procedural 
measures as courts dislike dismissing claims at the demurrer stage of 
litigation.87  The rules of civil procedure at the pre-discovery phase will 
typically only allow dismissal if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”88  Implementing a standard of review for potential SLAPPs would 
involve judicial review of the “probability” or “possibility” of the plaintiff 
winning on the merits outlined in the pre-discovery phase; though using the 
term “probability” would likely invoke a preponderance test and 
“possibility” would likely utilize a substantial evidence test.89  Both tests 
would also likely require some level of evidence, perhaps submitted by 
affidavit, speaking to the merits of the claim.90  These tests could be 
codified by statute or courts could use their common-law holdings in cases 
to act separately. 
All of these procedural remedies to protect defendants against 
unwarranted, meritless claims could be employed in some version by the 
legislature of the state of North Dakota or by the Supreme Court.  In terms 
of Empower, the lower court, prompted by the defendants, did the right 
thing and expedited hearing the case when the chilling effect of speech was 
asserted.91  The process could have been further expedited if an accelerated 
review mechanism had been in place.  Also, an accelerated appellate review 
measure could have moved the case more quickly to the high court where 
 
85. See Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984). 
86. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (2011). 
87. Barker, supra note 4, at 409. 
88. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); North Dakota 
follows the federal standard set forth in Conley.  See also Rose v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 2001 
ND 154, ¶ 10, 632 N.W.2d 429, 434 (citing Johnson & Maxwell, Ltd. v. Lind, 288 N.W.2d 763, 
765 (N.D.1980).  Massachusetts also follows the federal standard set forth in Conley.  Bell v. 
Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Mass. 1985).  Similarly, in New York a defendant must show 
“‘conclusively that [the] plaintiff has no cause of action.’  [And] that, in light of the evidence 
presented, ‘no significant dispute exists.’”  SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 517 
N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (citations omitted).  Colorado courts will dismiss “if 
recovery would be constitutionally prohibited, and . . . such infirmity appears on the face of the 
complaint.”  Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass’n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Colo. App. 1983). 
89. Barker, supra note 4, at 411-13. 
90. Id. at 409-13. 
91. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 10, Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 N.W.2d 
381, available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/20120191.atb.htm. 
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the dismissal was affirmed.  A heightened pleading standard would also 
have moved the case quickly through the process.  These measures deal 
mainly with the pleading stage of the SLAPP.  Substantive anti-SLAPP 
measures to complement the procedural measures are available as well. 
B. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES 
Substantive remedies include variations on traditional tort defenses, 
duties owed to the court, and other common defensive counterclaims or 
countersuits referred to as SLAPP-backs.  The implementation of most 
substantive remedies relies heavily on the courts to use holdings in case law 
that potentially benefit a defendant in SLAPPs.  Privileges, certain forms of 
immunities, and attorney’s fees are also aspects of substantive statutory law 
possibly helpful to SLAPP defendants. 
The best defense to a SLAPP is to be informed of the possibility of 
becoming a SLAPP defendant due to your actions.92  Citizens concerned 
with SLAPPs in some of the more common claims may take specific 
measures.93  In considering speaking out against a powerful real estate 
developer or public figure, citizens would be wise to avoid personal or ad 
hominem attacks, insults, or inflammatory statements.94  Advocacy groups 
can nullify some of the more serious outcomes by incorporating and 
purchasing insurance that would cover potential litigation arising from their 
activities.95  These practical, prophylactic measures hardly soften the blow 
of SLAPPs and are inadequate if a lay person unfamiliar with the workings 
of the court system finds themselves victims of a SLAPP. 
Also inadequate, but presently available, are provisions in attorney 
ethical codes that carry with them sanctions designed to deter bad 
behavior.96  Under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney may 
not file suit to only harass or delay.97  Under the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the lawyer need not subjectively believe the 
argument will prevail;  however, the lawyer must believe an argument is 
made in good faith including that modification or reversal of existing law 
be made in good faith.98  Rule 11 violations, and violations of the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility are generally difficult to prove and sanctions do 
 
92. Barker, supra note 4, at 414. 
93. Id. at 414-15. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 416. 
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); N.D. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(2) (see supra note 68 for full text). 
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.1 (2006). 
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not in general provide enough deterrence to SLAPP plaintiffs and their 
counsel.99  In Empower, defendants offered no motion to the court that Rule 
11 had been violated.  One explanation is that it would extend the dispute 
further since plaintiffs’ attorneys are afforded the opportunity to defend 
their actions which requires more pleading and briefing on issues related to 
the violation.  Again, the motivation of forcing defendants to incur costs 
and spend time would be satisfied in some respect with further litigation. 
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances offers 
citizens a cognizable privilege to political advocacy.100  The First 
Amendment right includes “the right of public debate, including the right to 
publish truthful statements, the right to demonstrate in public, and the right 
to report violations or make complaints to government bodies.”101  The 
right to petition is powerful, and one of the most effective defenses to 
SLAPPs that involve private citizens making statements to governmental 
bodies or the public in general.102  Courts have stressed time and again the 
fundamental importance of the right to petition.103  Even if a SLAPP 
defendant does not raise the petition privilege, it is not considered 
waived.104  The right to petition does not rely on the outcome of the case 
based on its merits; instead it is a nearly absolute privilege collateral to any 
tort liability alleged or proven by a plaintiff.105  A defendant having a 
financial or personal interest at stake in the SLAPP does not overcome the 
petition privilege.106  The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,107 or the sham 
 
99. Barker, supra note 4, at 419. 
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
101. Paula Goedert, The SLAPP Suit Threat:  Squelching Public Debate, 22 AM. LIBR. 1003, 
1003 (1991). 
102. Barker, supra note 4, at 426. 
103. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Sierra 
Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Matossian v. Fahmie, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532, 
535 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 
1961); see also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting “it is clear beyond 
peradventure that [the right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances] is 
at the core of protected First Amendment speech . . . .”). 
104. See Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Ass’n, 670 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Colo. App.1983). 
105. See Matossian, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 535-36. 
106. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).  
This landmark case extended the petitioning privilege to defendants who were financially 
interested in the subject matter of their petitioning and were therefore inferably malicious or at 
least selfishly motivated. 
107. The original line of cases articulating the Supreme Court’s sham exception rules was in 
the antitrust area.  See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 
144. Subsequent courts, however, have applied the sham exception outside the antitrust setting.  
See, e.g., Matossian, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. District Court, 677 
P.2d 1361, 1366 (Colo. 1984). 
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exception rule, states that petitioning cannot be “completely to prevent a 
competitor from gaining access to government; the petitioner must be 
genuinely seeking redress.”108  In Empower, defendants could have made a 
claim of petition privilege based on their right of free speech and privilege 
to take part in the political process.  Although it seems counterintuitive, 
since they are public officials not petitioning the government, the privilege 
includes petition to the electorate and a general privilege of participating in 
public discourse.109 
SLAPP-backs generally involve claims for malicious prosecution 
and/or abuse of process.110  SLAPP-backs are only effective as 
counterclaims and may be too little, too late.111  They generally involve a 
large damage award112 if successful and are highly publicized, but very 
rarely do they succeed.113  Their main drawback is SLAPP-backs fail to 
“actually prevent the negative effects of SLAPPs, such as delay, initial cost, 
and intimidation.”114 
Abuse of process in terms of SLAPP-backs involves claiming the suit 
is proper or legitimate but for some improper, collateral purpose.115  The 
elements of an abuse of process counterclaim are:  (1) an “ulterior motive,” 
(2) wrongful use of process, and (3) proximate causation of damage or 
harm.116  A SLAPP defendant must prove the plaintiff used the initial suit 
as a threat or blackmail.117  These elements, especially “ulterior motive,” 
are difficult to prove as with most lawsuits that require an explanation of 
motive.  Abuse of process is procedural in that it is unrelated to the merits 
of the original SLAPP.118  Unlike malicious prosecution, which attacks the 
merits of the SLAPP, abuse of process seeks to prove the initial suit was 
used “as a threat or a club . . . a form of extortion.”119 
 
108. Barker, supra note 4, at 428. 
109. See discussion infra Part I.A., note 19. 
110. Barker, supra note 4, at 431. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 431-32. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 432. 
115. Id. at 433. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 434. 
118. Id. 
119. Spellens v. Spellens, 317 P.2d 613, 627 (1957) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
PROSSER ON TORTS § 100 (2d. ed. 1955)); see also Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, 
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575 (1986) (explaining that “lack of probable 
cause” element of malicious prosecution cannot be circumvented by expanding abuse of process 
to encompass alleged improper filing of lawsuit). 
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Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, requires: (1) the original 
SLAPP plaintiff won the initial action; (2) the SLAPP plaintiff must not 
have had probable cause to bring the suit; and (3) the SLAPP defendant as 
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution claim must show the original SLAPP 
was filed for an improper purpose.120  “In malicious prosecution, the filing 
of the suit itself is improper because the plaintiff had no probable cause and 
a malicious purpose.”121  The defense to malicious prosecution is “advice of 
counsel” which requires that the defendant had sought and followed the 
lawyer’s advice and followed it before commencing or maintaining the 
action and had made “full, fair and complete disclosure” to the attorney of 
all relevant information.122  And, the defendant must have actually believed 
the plaintiff was liable.123  The advantage of a malicious prosecution is the 
potential for large damage awards.124  The drawback is delay caused by the 
required element that the original SLAPP plaintiff won the SLAPP suit.125 
The defendants in Empower could have pursued any number of the 
aforementioned options.  The fact that they did not may speak to their 
inadequacy as deterrents.  Attorney’s fees and punitive damages are 
available to plaintiffs of successful SLAPP-back counterclaims and are 
largely determined by state law limits on awards.  It would be fitting for the 
legislature to consider tailoring larger damage awards for counterclaims 
involving SLAPPs if only to publicize their displeasure with SLAPPs and, 
hopefully, deter potential SLAPP plaintiffs.  A close look to a jurisdiction 
like California, with a history of anti-SLAPP legislation and case law, may 
provide insight into how North Dakota might best protect political speech in 
the context of SLAPPs. 
IV. CALIFORNIA’S HISTORY WITH SLAPPS 
California enacted its first anti-SLAPP law in 1992.126  Since then, it 
has been amended six times.127  Since anti-SLAPP measures are relatively 
new in American jurisprudence, many issues arose out of early 
 
120. Id. 
121. Barker, supra note 4, at 435. 
122. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback:  The Misuse of Libel Law 
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 444 n.87 (1991). 
123. Id.  
124. Barker, supra note 4, at 434. 
125. Id. at 434-35. 
126. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 726 (West). 
127. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1239 (West); 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 960 (West); 
2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 535 (West); 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 65 (West); 2010 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 328 (West). 
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applications.128  Most questions have been answered as the statute has 
matured.129  The questions most vital for examination in this article as 
potential difficulties the North Dakota courts might encounter involve 
scope, discovery, and the award of attorney’s fees to successful SLAPP 
defendants. 
A. CALIFORNIA:  A MODEL FOR NORTH DAKOTA? 
One of the threshold issues that California faced in applying its 
relatively new anti-SLAPP statute was its reach and scope.130  California 
courts wrestled with whether the special motion to strike131 required a 
defendant to show that the lawsuit was initiated with a forbidden purpose.  
The California Supreme Court in Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer 
Cause, Inc.132 held  the defendant need not make a showing of improper 
purpose and the subjective intent of the SLAPP plaintiff is immaterial.133  
The court stated “a neutral, easily applied definition for SLAPP’s avoids 
subjective judgments about filers’ or targets’ motives, good faith, or 
intent.”134  In a companion case, the court also addressed whether to apply 
an intent-to-chill test on the plaintiff’s motives.135  Subjective intent of 
SLAPP plaintiffs is difficult to prove with certainty.  Thus, the court stuck 
to the objective legal standard of whether the chilling occurred.136 
Similarly, the courts struggled early as to whether the statute should be 
applied in “paradigm” cases.137  That is, should the statute solely serve to 
 
128. Jerome I. Braun, California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 731, 735 (2003). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 736-37. 
131. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (1995). 
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of 
the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special 
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there 
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. 
Id. 
132. 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002). 
133. Braun, supra note 128, at 737. 
134. Equilon Enterpises, 52 P.3d at 690 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court also noted 
that an “intent to chill” requirement could conflict with the privilege statute, Civil Code section 
47.  “Were we to impose an intent-to-chill proof requirement, petitioning that is absolutely 
privileged under the litigation privilege would be deprived of anti-SLAPP protection whenever a 
moving defendant could not prove that the plaintiff harbored an intent to chill that activity.  Our 
construction avoids that anomalous result.”  Id.  Finally, the Court referred to policy reasons 
against imposing such a requirement.  Id. at 692-93. 
135. City of Cotati v. Cashman, 52 P.3d 695 (Cal. 2002). 
136. Braun, supra note 128, at 737-38. 
137. Id. at 738. 
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quash attempts by large land developers from silencing their critics, or 
should it apply more broadly to various defendants facing a SLAPP’s 
chilling effect?138  It eventually became accepted that the anti-SLAPP 
measure applied broadly and “[b]oth legislative mandate and judicial 
interpretation have expanded the application of the anti-SLAPP statute 
beyond its paradigmatic origins.”139  Questions also arose as what was 
meant by “a public issue or an issue of public interest.”140  In Rivero v. 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,141 the 
court held broadly the public issue requirement of the statute was met 
where “the subject statements . . . concerned a person or entity in the public 
eye, conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the 
direct participants[,] or a topic of widespread, public interest.”142  The 
California courts broadened the application of public issue even further, 
stating: 
More particular questions about the reach of the statute also have 
been answered. Speech by governments and public officials is 
covered by the statute.143 Speech by mail is covered.144 Things 
said about candidates or issues in an election campaign are 
covered.145 The same seems to be true of prominent election 
participants who are not themselves candidates.146 Union elections 
 
138. Id. 
139. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 508 (Ct. App. 2001);  Vess v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).  Years earlier, Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 880, 885 (Ct. App. 1995), held the same way:  although the paradigm “provides useful 
background regarding SLAPP suits, we are governed by familiar rules of statutory interpretation 
in evaluating whether section 425.16 can be applied to this action.”  Id.  As the statute provided no 
paradigmatic limitation, the courts would not add one.  Id. 
140. Braun, supra note 128, at 745. 
141. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Ct. App. 2003). 
142. Id. at 89 (citations omitted). 
143. See Bradbury v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that the 
statute covers district attorney’s speech); Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 77 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 1998) (ruling county government speech is protected); Schroeder v. 
Irvine City Council, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 337 n. 3 (Ct. App. 2002) (ruling city council speech is 
protected).  In Schroeder, the court inserted a disclaimer into its footnote, saying “we do not 
categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically 
qualify for treatment under section 425.16. . . .”  Id. 
144. See Macias v. Hartwell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 225 (Ct. App. 1997). 
145. See, e.g., Conroy v. Spitzer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 447-48 (Ct. App. 1999).  Section 
425.16 applies to suits involving statements made during a political campaign, statements made in 
connection with a recall election, statements made in a political flyer concerning a candidate and 
statements made in a recall petition.  Macias, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-24. Roberts v. Los Angeles 
Cnty. Bar Ass’n., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 552 (Ct. App. 2003) (Bar Association’s evaluation of 
judicial candidate).  “Our Constitution protects everyone—even politicians.”  Beilenson v. 
Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 359 (Ct. App. 1996). 
146. See Sipple v. Found for Nat'l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 685 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[T]he details of appellant’s career and appellant’s ability to capitalize on domestic violence 
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count as elections for this purpose.147 But although activities 
related to an election are covered, where the election-related 
activity is itself illegal, the statute offers no protection, because the 
activity was not a “valid” exercise of constitutional rights as stated 
in the preamble.148 It does not matter whether the speech is made 
on behalf of others,149 and “[t]here is no requirement that the 
writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body,150 
recruiting and encouraging others to speak out on a matter of 
public interest [comes] within the protection of section 425.16.151” 
For the purpose of analysis in the context of scope and reach, the above 
list deals mainly with types of political speech that should be protected 
from SLAPPs in North Dakota.  Although seemingly broad, the above 
forms of protected speech address California’s treatment of the type of 
political activity found in Empower. 
The California courts also dealt with their discretionary role in limiting 
or granting discovery when a plaintiff is attempting to show a prima facie 
case.152  Subsection (g) of the statute provides: 
All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the 
filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section.  The stay 
of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order 
ruling on the motion.  The court, on noticed motion and for good 
cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted 
notwithstanding this subdivision.153 
 
issues in his advertising campaigns for politicians known around the world, while allegedly 
committing violence against his former wives, are public issues, and the article is subject to the 
protection of section 425.16.”). 
147. See Macias, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. 
148. See Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 866-67 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(discussing the laundering of campaign contributions).  Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(a) 
(2003) (“the valid exercise of the constitutional rights . . .).  In Paul for Council, “the court noted 
that the probability that the Legislature intended to give defendants section 425.16 protection from 
a lawsuit based on injuries they are alleged to have caused by their illegal campaign money 
laundering scheme is as unlikely as the probability that such protection would exist for them if 
they injured plaintiff while robbing a bank to obtain the money for the campaign contributions or 
while hijacking a car to drive the campaign contributions to the post office for mailing.  Under the 
facts demonstrated by this record, we cannot permit defendants to wrap themselves in this vital 
legislation.”  Paul, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871. 
149. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1999). 
150. Ludwig v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 1995). 
151. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 835 (Ct. App. 
1996) (citing Ludwig, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357); see also Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 446, 456-57 (Ct. App. 1994); Braun, supra note 128, at 745-47. 
152. Id. at 763. 
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (2011). 
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California courts have held that unless there is a showing the matter 
proposed to be discovered materially implicates the elements of the prima 
facie showing in order to avoid a strike, a court may deny and stay the 
request.154  The threshold requirement here seems reasonable in the context 
of a possible suit that has the potential to chill the type of political speech 
found in Empower. 
How and when to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a 
SLAPP suit has posed two major problems for the California courts.  First, 
if a SLAPP plaintiff is subject to a motion to strike and voluntarily 
dismisses the suit, whether attorney’s fees should be awarded has become 
an issue in the courts.155  One court held that a defendant was not required 
by statute to receive fees after the SLAPP was dismissed prior to a ruling on 
the motion to strike.156  Second is the determination of what is a 
“reasonable” fee within the discretion of the court.157  Both of these 
questions regarding attorney’s fee awards to prevailing defendants would 
fall within the discretion of North Dakota judges.  The award of fees is an 
important tool, not just deter SLAPP suits, but to guarantee that SLAPP 
defendants are not rolled over by interests with deep pockets.  The ultimate 
goal of these measures is to level the playing field to a degree where 
plaintiffs will think twice before deciding to bring a SLAPP suit to silence 
their political or economic opponents. 
In Empower, California’s motion to strike anti-SLAPP measure would 
have expedited the process and un-chilled the public officials’ rights to 
political speech.  The question here is whether North Dakota should broadly 
apply the SLAPP statutes to protect all manner of public interest issues, or 
narrowly draft a statute to cover only the political speech that was denied in 
Empower.  I would advocate for somewhere in the middle.  The statute 
should not be so narrow that it only covers public officials and their petition 
privilege to make statements to the electorate.  Instead, it should be tailored 
to protect the political speech itself.  It seems simple to assume that only 
public officials could be subject to the type of suit that Empower the 
Taxpayer brought.  Speech is the object of protection.  It just so happens 
that a SLAPP affected the political speech of public officials in Empower.  
Nor should the political speech be protected with anti-SLAPP legislation in 
the context of only ballot initiatives.  The protection proffered in such 
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legislation should protect all political activity, including, but not limited to, 
elections, advocacy, notice and comment, and union organizing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, there seems to be little dispute that political speech should be 
protected from the chilling effects of meritless lawsuits.  SLAPPs are a 
common tool that powerful interests use to silence, delay, diffuse, or 
otherwise gain unfair political advantage.  Empower the Taxpayer, as a 
citizen group, took full advantage of North Dakota’s lack of anti-SLAPP 
measures when they brought dozens of public officials into court.  North 
Dakota’s court system wisely rejected the suit, but the damage had been 
done.  As a liberal democratic society, we want public officials and the 
electorate to have a rigorous debate of the issues.  If the public does not like 
the outcomes, the ballot box should be the final arbiter.  Over half of the 
states have passed laws to deal with the deleterious effect of SLAPPs.  The 
substantive and procedural mechanisms mentioned here provide guidance 
to North Dakota’s legislature and courts.  Political speech is of vital 
importance to our democracy and should be protected when the occasion 
calls for it.  This is such an occasion. 
 
 Brent Jaenicke∗ 
 
 
 ∗ 2014 J.D. candidate, University of North Dakota School of Law.  I would like to dedicate 
this article to my parents Beverly and Duane without whom I would not have this opportunity to 
pursue my dreams.  I love you both dearly.   
